

# Deep excavations

## ■ Observational method

- Sir Alan Muir Wood
- Used where detailed analysis very difficult
- Principles
  - ◆ Make non-conservative estimates of forces
  - ◆ Consider implications of error
  - ◆ Plan monitoring of forces and deflections
  - ◆ Plan contingency in case of error



# Deep excavations


## ■ Marina Bay Station

- Soil profile
  - ◆ Hydraulic fill over soft marine clay
- Heavy sheet piles with I-beams
- Excavation by backhoe
- Strutting
- Fill with water




## ■ Marina Bay Station

- Excavate by grab
- Bored piles
- Tremie slab
- Lower water and monitor strut loads and deflections








### Stage 2

- 2.1 Flood cofferdam up to top level
- 2.2 Excavate under water down to base
- 2.3 Install bored piles by RCD method



**Stage 3**

- 3.1 Cast tremie slab
- 3.2 Pump out water
- 3.3 Monitor strut loads and wall deflections
- 3.4 Build station







# Deep excavations


## ■ Instrumentation and monitoring

- Loads/stresses
  - ◆ strain gauges
  - ◆ pressure cells
- Deformations
  - ◆ Extensometers
  - ◆ Inclinometers
  - ◆ Survey






Pressure cell










CHECKSUM

$$(+\theta) + (-\theta) = 0$$



CHECKSUM

$$(+\theta - \delta) + (-\theta - \delta) = -2\delta$$





# Deep excavations

## ■ Collapse at Lok Fu Station, HKMTRC

- Checkers queried strutting design
- Designers would not respond
- Checkers insisted on monitoring
- Collapse occurred
- Monitoring survey data in desk drawer
- When plotted showed progressive wall movement
- Firewater main behind wall with T-branch across road
- Firewater main failed in tension





End of  
water pipe



# Deep excavations

- **City Hall Station, Singapore MRT**
  - Two level soil profile
    - ◆ Anchored sheet piles at upper level
    - ◆ Anchored pads at lower level
  - Anchors failed on Whit Sunday 1985
  - Backfill to stabilise
  - Dewatering surface sands
  - Contiguous pile wall through backfill
  - Anchors with vertical and horizontal walings























# Deep excavations

- **Failure of sheet piled cofferdam in Bangkok**
  - Extrapolation of strutting system from small rectangles to large excavation
  - Reentrant corners






20 m



200 m






# Deep excavations

## ■ Yannawa Wastewater Treatment Plant

- Inlet Pumping Station
- Collapse of diaphragm walled shaft on 17 August 1997
- Difficult, restricted site
- Circular PS shaft and “rectangular” inlet/bypass chamber
- Poor strut detail
- Poor strutting installation
- Lack of monitoring






Figure 2. Temporary bracing system (Initial design)







Figure 3. Final Temporary bracing system (after Kanok-Nukulchai et al., 1998).



aged


king






Cracks in capping beam










 **EarthTech**  
A *tyco* International Ltd. Company

A BETTER TOMORROW made possible

# Deep excavations

- **Collapse of cut and cover tunnel at Gerrards Cross, UK**
  - Existing railway line in cutting
  - Land being reclaimed for Tesco superstore
  - Precast “pinned” arches built on piled ground beams
  - Backfill over
  - Collapsed on 30 June 2005 at 7:30pm – no injuries













**The collapse happened because not enough fill had been placed to the sides of the tunnel before material was placed on the crown.**



# Deep excavations

- Collapse of Nicoll Highway on 20<sup>th</sup> April 2004, caused by incident at MRT Circle Line Worksite
  - Contract 824 included
    - ◆ NCH Station, 3-level underground 327 m long
    - ◆ BLV Station, 3-level partly underground 246 m long
    - ◆ 800 m of twin bored tunnels
    - ◆ 2 km of cut-and-cover tunnels, mainly in soft marine clay






FIGURE 1.5

OVERVIEW OF CIRCLE LINE STAGE 1 (CCL1)




FIGURE 1.6

OVERVIEW OF CONTRACT 824 (A)

# Deep excavations

- 2 km of cut-and-cover included CC2 (211 m)
  - ◆ Type L – 46 m
  - ◆ Type M1 – 44 m
  - ◆ Type M2 – 88 m
  - ◆ Type M3 – 33 m
- Tender design based on
  - ◆ excavation depth 34.5 m
  - ◆ Soft Clay thickness 35 m
  - ◆ 9 levels of struts
  - ◆ Single JGP slab beneath 9<sup>th</sup> layer





FIGURE 1.8


OVERVIEW OF CC2 (TYPE L, M1, M2 AND M3)



# Deep excavations

- Developed design
  - ◆ 10 levels of struts
  - ◆ 2 levels of JGP slab, upper level between 9<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup> strut levels sacrificial
- Very difficult conditions
  - ◆ ~ 35 m deep
  - ◆ Soft clays to about 40 m
  - ◆ Hard ground beneath walls






Source : Fig 7.1 of LTA Expert Report

**Figure 2.13**


Settlement monitoring data in the C824 area from June 2000 to December 2001.






Circle Line C824  
Soil Inclinator (IS-104)

*(taken between the period between Oct 2003 to Apr 2004)*










# Deep excavations

The Commission of Inquiry found two “root” causes:

- **Under-design of the diaphragm wall**
  - Related to FE analysis using Plaxis and failure to understand soil model
- **Under-design of the strut/waler connections at the 9<sup>th</sup> level**







Source: NLC Expert Report, Figure 10.6.1





Source: Exhibit E93





Exhibit 15.3A: S338 (north) (9<sup>th</sup> level) on 20 April 2004 morning





**Exhibit 15.3A: S335 (south) (9<sup>th</sup> level) on 20 April 2004 Between 10am to 10.30am**





3:47 pm





- “Wisarut and I wanted to run but we were unable to do so. I felt trapped and could only step aside to avoid the gas tanks, lorry and beam that moved towards us. I was frightened and thought of my family and my young child at that time. I thought that I might die at that point.” – *Muenpatcha Wichian (Thai labourer)*
- “Ng Joo Tong (*LTA Project Engineer*) .... Saw a LTA staff arriving and asked him to take over the traffic diversion (on Nicoll Highway). Ng, who was in shock, then sat along the roadside and cried.”
- “according to Chikushi, Andy Wong (*NLCJV Project Engineer*) tried to tell him something but could not speak coherently.”



For further details see:

[www.mom.gov.sg](http://www.mom.gov.sg)